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How Will Unemployment Fare 
Following the Recession?
By Edward S. Knotek II and Stephen Terry
S
ince the start of the recession in December 2007, the U.S. unem-
ployment rate has risen more than four percentage points. Similar 
sharp increases in unemployment have occurred in other severe 
recessions, such as those in 1973-75 and 1981-82. In the aftermath of 
those severe recessions, the economy rapidly recovered and unemploy-
ment quickly declined.
Will  unemployment  behave  similarly  following  this  recession?   
One reason why unemployment may not fall as quickly this time is 
that the labor market has changed substantively since the early 1980s. 
In the two recoveries since then, not only did unemployment continue 
to climb, but it remained persistently high in what have been termed 
“jobless recoveries.”  To the extent that labor market changes were re-
sponsible for these jobless recoveries, unemployment following the cur-
rent recession may also be slow to recover.
A second reason unemployment may not fall quickly this time 
is that the recession has been coupled with a systemic banking crisis. 
While the United States has not had many instances of similar crises 
in the past, evidence from the experiences of other countries may shed 
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light on how future unemployment in the United States is likely to 
behave. In general, the international data reveal large and persistent 
increases in unemployment in the aftermath of such events.
This article examines these factors and quantifies their potential 
implications for the future U.S. unemployment rate. The analysis sug-
gests that recent trends in labor markets, combined with the presence 
of a banking crisis in the current recession, raise the likelihood that 
unemployment will recover much more slowly from this recession than 
past episodes of severe recession may suggest. Moreover, such a slow 
recovery has the potential to raise important questions for policymak-
ers, including the level of unemployment consistent with their goals.
The first section of the article shows the similarities between the 
current recession and past severe recessions, which were followed by 
quick declines in unemployment. The second section looks more close-
ly at the jobless recoveries following recent recessions and changes in 
the labor market since the early 1980s. The third section broadens the 
analysis to examine international experiences with banking crises and 
unemployment. The fourth section discusses the implications of past 
U.S. recessions and the international evidence surrounding banking 
crises for the future course of the U.S. unemployment rate.
I.   UNEMPLOYMENT AND SEVERE RECESSIONS
The severity of recessions has varied greatly over the last 40 years. 
For example, the rise in unemployment from the start of each reces-
sion to its conclusion has ranged from one to four percentage points 
(Chart 1). By a number of metrics, however, the current recession has 
closely resembled two of the most severe recessions, those of 1973-75 
and 1981-82.
First, each of these three recessions has lasted longer than the aver-
age postwar recession.1 According to the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), both the 1973-75 and 1981-82 downturns lasted 
16 months, considerably longer than the average of ten months. The 
current recession is expected to last at least as long as these severe re-
cessions. Using NBER’s date for the most recent business cycle peak 
(December 2007), as well as other data available as of this writing, this 
recession is likely to be the longest since the Great Depression. ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2009  7
Second, all three recessions have involved above-average drops in 
GDP. The average postwar recession coincided with a 1.7 percent de-
cline in the level of GDP.2 The 1973-75 and 1981-82 GDP declines 
were 3.1 and 2.6 percent, respectively. In the current recession, GDP 
had dropped 2.2 percent through the first quarter of 2009. The GDP 
decline during this recession would be larger if not for strong growth in 
the second quarter of 2008.3
Third, in all three recessions, unemployment has experienced strong 
increases. Chart 2 shows changes in unemployment relative to its level 
during the month of the NBER-defined business cycle peak.4 The cur-
rent recession’s unemployment path, for example, is normalized by sub-
tracting 4.9 percent (the December 2007 unemployment rate) from 
subsequent readings. Through May 2009, the unemployment path re-
mained very close to those of the 1973-75 and 1981-82 recessions.
The similarities between the current recession and the two other 
severe recessions raise the possibility that unemployment will take a 
similar path in the recovery. Following the 1973-75 and 1981-82 reces-
sions, unemployment fell sharply within a year after the recession’s end. 
Thereafter, it drifted down slowly, especially after the 1973-75 reces-
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sion. Four years after the onset of the 1981-82 recession, unemploy-
ment had essentially returned to its pre-recession level. Four years after 
the onset of the 1973-75 recession, it remained two percentage points 
above its pre-recession level.5
More generally, historical evidence shows severe recessions have 
been followed by strong recoveries, while mild recessions have been fol-
lowed by weak recoveries. Chart 3 illustrates this relationship for unem-
ployment: The more unemployment rises during a recession, the more 
it typically falls in the year afterward.6 Given that unemployment has 
risen more than four percentage points, history suggests that unem-
ployment should fall between one and four percentage points in the 12 
months following this recession.
However, such an outcome is not assured. Following the two most 
recent recessions, unemployment broke with historical precedent: It 
rose following the end of the recessions and remained high in the recov-
ery. These episodes suggest that the behavior of unemployment follow-
ing recessions may have changed.
Chart 2
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II.   RECENT RECESSIONS AND CHANGES IN THE LABOR 
MARKET
The two most recent recessions in 1990-91 and 2001 raise the pos-
sibility that unemployment is less likely to fall rapidly when a recession 
ends. In the aftermath of these recessions, which were mild by histori-
cal standards, unemployment continued to rise rather than fall. This 
section examines how changes in labor markets since the 1980s may 
have altered the behavior of unemployment after recessions. 
The 1990-91 and 2001 recessions provide a number of contrasts 
to the current situation. Both recessions were short, lasting only eight 
months. Neither recession caused a large drop in the economy’s output. 
GDP fell 1.3 percent during the 1990-91 recession, half as much as in 
the first five quarters of the current recession, and GDP actually rose 0.3 
percent during the 2001 recession.7 As shown in Chart 4, unemploy-
ment climbed 1.3 percentage points during the 1990-91 recession and 
1.2 percentage points during the 2001 recession—half of the average 
increase in unemployment in postwar recessions and less than a third of 
the increase in the current recession.
Chart 3


































Change in unemployment during the year 
following the recession, percentage points
Change in unemployment 
during the recession, 
percentage points
Note: Each diamond is one completed recession. The horizontal axis shows the change in the unemployment rate 
from the month of the business cycle peak to the month of the business cycle trough, as defined by the NBER. The 
vertical axis shows the change in unemployment from the month of the business cycle trough to 12 months later.10  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The small increases in unemployment during these two recent re-
cessions are only part of the story. Perhaps the most interesting and 
unusual feature of these recessions is that unemployment continued to 
rise substantially well after the recessions ended and GDP had resumed 
growing. Unemployment did not turn downward until 16 months af-
ter the official end of the 1990-91 recession and 20 months after the 
2001 recession. These episodes came to be known as jobless recover-
ies—that is, periods in which the economy was recovering, but unem-
ployment was still moving higher.8
Economists have offered a number of explanations for these jobless 
recoveries. One view holds that the long expansions of the 1980s and 
1990s were partly responsible for the jobless recoveries, since this gave 
firms incentives to delay organizational restructuring until the next re-
cession.9 A second view suggests that jobless recoveries occurred because 
mild recessions are often followed by weak recoveries. When firms see 
a mild recession, they suspend hiring and let normal attrition reduce 
payrolls rather than relying on deep layoffs. As a result, when the reces-
Chart 4
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sion ends, payrolls are still higher than desired, causing firms to wait 
a lengthy period before resuming hiring—hence, a jobless recovery.10
A third explanation for jobless recoveries is that labor markets have 
changed fundamentally since the early 1980s. Two labor market chang-
es, in particular, have garnered considerable attention from economists. 
First, the pattern of layoffs has moved away from temporary layoffs—
in which workers expect to return to their old job when conditions 
improve—toward more permanent layoffs. Second, just-in-time em-
ployment practices have risen in prominence. These practices include 
the use of overtime hours, part-time workers, and various forms of out-
sourcing—through contracting with temporary-help (“temp”) firms or 
consulting firms—that have given firms more flexibility and have con-
tributed to leaner staffing of permanent, full-time workers.11
To illustrate changes in the pattern of layoffs, Chart 5 displays the 
composition of the unemployed. At any point, unemployed workers 
fall into one of three categories: (1) workers temporarily laid off from 
their previous job; (2) workers permanently laid off from their previ-
ous job; and (3) the remainder of the unemployed: people who have 
just entered or reentered the labor force and are looking for work, and 
workers who quit their previous job.
During recessions, the composition of the unemployed changes to 
reflect inflows of laid-off workers. What distinguishes recent recessions 
from earlier recessions is the nature of the layoffs. During the 1990-91 
and 2001 recessions, the percentage of the unemployed who were on 
temporary layoffs rose only slightly. During the current recession, this 
percentage has been essentially unchanged. In all three recessions, the 
increase in the proportion of laid-off workers has been largely a result 
of permanent layoffs. By contrast, in earlier recessions—including the 
severe recessions of 1973-75 and 1981-82—the composition of the 
unemployed shifted dramatically to both permanent and temporary 
layoffs.12
The reduced reliance on temporary layoffs during recessions has 
important implications for the behavior of unemployment during re-
coveries. Temporary layoffs can be reversed quickly once conditions 
improve. Employers and employees need only reestablish their former 
relationship.1312  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Permanent  layoffs,  however,  break  the  worker-firm  relationship. 
They force workers to search for a new job, perhaps at a new company 
or in a new field, industry, or geographic area.14 The process of matching 
an unemployed worker with a new firm takes more time than rehiring a 
worker from a temporary layoff. It also costs more for the firm to screen 
potential workers and increases the uncertainty of whether the new hire 
will work out. Thus, the increased use of permanent layoffs during reces-
sions makes firms more likely to delay hiring during recoveries.
Another factor that may delay hiring in highly uncertain times, 
such as the aftermath of a recession, is the availability of just-in-time 
labor.15 In the absence of just-in-time labor, firms might normally hire 
permanent workers in the early stages of a recovery to be ready to sat-
isfy increased demand for their product when it eventually materializes. 
If firms have the option of using just-in-time labor on an as-needed 
basis, it becomes less important to preemptively hire workers in an-
ticipation of stronger future demand (Aaronson and others 2004a). 
Rather, firms can simply wait until the demand actually materializes 
and quickly adjust labor.16
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While the evidence is not conclusive, such changes in labor markets 
since the early 1980s appear to have produced conditions conducive to 
restrained, delayed hiring in the aftermath of recessions.17 Following 
the most recent two recessions, this weakness in hiring contributed to 
jobless recoveries. To the extent that these structural changes in the la-
bor market have persisted through the current recession, it is distinctly 
possible that unemployment going forward may not decline as rapidly 
as it did following other severe recessions.
III.  INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE ON BANKING CRISES
In spite of the parallels between the current and past recessions, 
one key difference remains: the ongoing banking crisis in the United 
States. It is natural to ask how this banking crisis may affect compari-
sons with other recessions. This is especially true since—outside of the 
Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s—the last U.S. experience with a 
nationwide banking crisis came during the Great Depression.18 To gain 
a better sense of the effects of these types of crises, this section examines 
other countries’ experiences with banking crises.
By a number of measures, the recent U.S. experience bears a strik-
ing resemblance to banking crises in other countries. As in the United 
States, past foreign financial crises have been preceded by easy access 
to credit, high levels of consumption with low savings rates, and rapid 
appreciation in asset prices.19 Once the crises hit, the imbalances rap-
idly reversed themselves. Financial intermediaries tightened the flow of 
credit, housing and equity prices fell sharply, and consumption growth 
and residential investment declined by more than usual during reces-
sions (Haugh and others; International Monetary Fund; Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2009). These similarities suggest that the behavior of output 
and unemployment following foreign banking crises may offer impor-
tant lessons for the United States going forward.
Studies of banking crises in foreign countries have found that such 
crises are usually followed by significant declines in output. A recent 
study by Cerra and Saxena considering a large sample of countries over 
a 40-year period showed that banking crises are associated with large 
declines in the level of GDP relative to its previous trend.20 These de-
clines are highly persistent: In high-income countries, the level of GDP 14  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
remains 15 percent below its previous trend ten years after the onset of 
the banking crisis.21 
Okun’s law posits that slow output growth is typically associated 
with rising unemployment, suggesting that if banking crises are fol-
lowed by reductions in output, they should also be associated with in-
creases in unemployment. The rest of this section extends the method-
ology of Cerra and Saxena to consider that issue. The empirical analysis 
finds that banking crises are followed by large and persistent increases 
in unemployment. However, slow growth can only explain part of this 
increase. Thus, other factors associated with banking crises may also 
influence unemployment during these episodes.
Banking crises and unemployment in an empirical model
The first step in examining the aftermaths of banking crises is to 
identify the dates of the crises. This article uses the crisis dates from a 
recent study by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008c). They use two criteria for 
identifying the start of a crisis: (1) the existence of bank runs that lead 
to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or more 
financial institutions; and (2) if there are no runs, the closure, merging, 
takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial 
institution that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other 
financial institutions.22
The Reinhart and Rogoff crisis dates cover a wide range of coun-
tries, including some with very low levels of development and econom-
ic structures dissimilar to the United States. For comparability with the 
United States, this analysis focuses on banking crises in high-income 
countries.23 Data on unemployment come from the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database for the period 
1960 to 2007.24 Combined, these datasets allow for a wide investiga-
tion of unemployment rates around banking crises.
To empirically assess the relationship between banking crises, un-
employment, and GDP, the analysis estimates a vector autoregression 
(VAR). The model allows the behavior of unemployment and GDP 
growth to depend on the start of banking crises, along with past values 
of both unemployment and GDP growth themselves. Reflecting Okun’s 
law, unemployment is also linked to current-year GDP growth.25 ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2009  15
Chart 6 plots the path of unemployment during the ten years fol-
lowing a banking crisis from the VAR estimates.26 Over four years, the 
estimated unemployment rate increases almost 2.5 percentage points. 
Thereafter, the unemployment rate begins a slow decline.27 
Because banking crises vary in severity, the above path should be 
regarded only as a typical outcome. (For a worst-case scenario of un-
employment outcomes, see box.) In contrast, some crises are associated 
with very mild unemployment increases—or even outright declines. 
For instance, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008c) date the beginning of the 
Savings and Loan crisis in the United States in 1984. During the first 
five years after the start of this crisis, the unemployment rate decreased 
4.1 percentage points. Such a pattern seems at odds with the current 
circumstances, which find the United States in the midst of a severe 
recession and banking crisis. Because previous studies have shown that 
recessions and financial distress can interact with each other in conse-
quential ways, this analysis now proceeds to consider how unemploy-
ment fares around banking crises that coincide with recessions. 28
Banking crises, unemployment, and recessions
The NBER evaluates a range of macroeconomic variables to iden-
tify the beginning of U.S. recessions. Some of these indicators are not 
readily accessible for the high-income countries included in this analy-
sis. Annual data pose further complications for identifying recessions. 
However,  U.S. recessions  have historically  corresponded  to  periods 
of annual GDP growth more than 1.25 standard deviations below 
its mean value. This analysis identifies recessions across high-income 
countries using this criterion.
Banking crises can last for long periods of time, and the onset of 
a banking crisis does not necessarily correspond to its most virulent 
stage. A recession may therefore be associated with a crisis that did not 
begin in the same year, complicating any interaction between the two 
events. Although an in-depth historical analysis would be required to 
definitively connect a particular recession with a given banking crisis, 
this analysis divides the banking crisis dates into two groups: (1) bank-
ing crises that are associated with recessions beginning within two years 
of the onset of the banking crisis; and (2) the remaining banking crises, 
which are not associated with recessions. For the sake of comparison, a 16  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Box
 THE BIG FIVE
Five particular banking crises in high-income nations stand out 
for their severity: Spain (1977), Norway (1987), Finland (1991), 
Sweden (1991), and Japan (1992). These crises have been labeled 
the “Big Five.”29 Unemployment dynamics after the Big Five crises 
may offer a “worst-case” unemployment scenario.
The experiences of the Big Five crises are presented in Chart A. 
In each case, unemployment increases above its pre-crisis level—in 
some cases dramatically—and remains elevated for a long time. 
Spain presents the worst of the worst-case scenarios. Spanish un-
employment increased nearly 17 percentage points during the first 
nine years after the onset of crisis in 1977. A decade after the crisis, 
it had retraced little of its rise. 
By virtue of being the median path for much of the time span, 
the experience of Sweden in the early 1990s is more typical for 
these five countries. In this case, unemployment rose eight per-
centage points and remained persistently high during the ten-year 
horizon. The Big Five crises clearly demonstrate that increases in 
the unemployment rate after banking crises can be large and linger 
for many years.
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third set of dates was also constructed: (3) recessions that began with-
out an associated banking crisis.
Based on the methodology used above, Chart 7 plots the move-
ments in unemployment after each type of event.30 Banking crises that 
occur with a recession are associated with large and persistent increases 
in unemployment. After these episodes, unemployment typically in-
creases by 3.5 percentage points over four years before slowly declining 
in later years. Around banking crises without recessions, such as the 
U.S. Savings and Loan crisis, the unemployment rate is effectively un-
changed.31 By comparison, when a recession occurs that is not associ-
ated with a banking crisis, unemployment rises two percentage points 
in three years before declining.32 
The VAR results suggest that the unusually large increase in unem-
ployment following the combination of a banking crisis and recession is 
due to two factors. First, such episodes tend to be associated with large 
declines in output. As mentioned earlier, the imbalances that build up 
before a banking crisis are usually quickly reversed once the crisis begins, 
producing significant disturbances in credit flows, large declines in eq-
Chart 6
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uity and housing wealth, and drastic reductions in household consump-
tion. These effects can interact to create larger losses in output than in 
downturns without banking crises.33 Through Okun’s law, these declines 
in output are associated with big increases in unemployment.
Second, the combination of a banking crisis with a recession may 
also have an unemployment effect above and beyond the output chan-
nel.34 For instance, reduced access to credit can cause firms to sharply 
reduce payrolls because of difficulties funding operating expenses. As 
output improves, these credit-constrained firms may increase worker 
hours rather than hire new workers, which would entail large up-front 
costs. More generally, hiring may also suffer from the large uncertainty 
that is an inherent feature of banking crises coupled with steep reces-
sions. In addition, the economic imbalances documented above may 
lead to a deeper and more prolonged period of reallocation of workers 
to new, more productive uses than occurs during the typical recession.
Recent studies have shown that both the run-up to and the conse-
quences of the current banking crisis and recession in the United States 
are comparable to similar severe international events. The empirical es-
Chart 7
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timates in this section suggest that, after such episodes, unemployment 
increases are unusually severe and persistent. The next section considers 
how these international results may apply to U.S. unemployment in 
the years ahead.
IV.   IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
The U.S. economy is in the midst of a prolonged, severe recession. 
Unemployment has increased substantially since the recession began, 
similar to its path during other severe recessions. At the same time, 
the labor market appears to have fundamentally changed since those 
earlier severe recessions. Temporary layoffs are now less frequent, and 
more flexible labor practices have arisen. Thus, unemployment dur-
ing this recession bears some similarities to recent recessions that were 
followed by jobless recoveries. Finally, complicating matters is the fact 
that the current recession is unusual in the recent U.S. experience by 
coinciding with a banking crisis. As shown in the last section, banking 
crises coupled with recessions are typically associated with large and 
persistent increases in unemployment.
This section considers how these competing factors may affect the 
U.S. unemployment rate going forward. It finds that—given recent 
labor market trends that could have produced jobless recoveries and 
given the current combination of a recession and a banking crisis—un-
employment may be much slower to recover from the current recession 
than past severe recessions would suggest.
How will unemployment fare following this recession?
The projections provided in Chart 8 follow three different scenar-
ios, based on the arguments set out in the previous three sections of 
this article.35 
(1) The dashed line was constructed under the assumption that the 
current recession is similar to other U.S. recessions from 1949 through 
1984, including the severe recessions of 1973-75 and 1981-82. To con-
struct the path, the change in unemployment was regressed on past 
changes in unemployment and differences between the unemployment 
rate and its “natural” rate.36 (According to the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO 2002), the natural rate of unemployment is the rate that 
reflects all sources of unemployment except fluctuations in the aggre-20  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
gate economy related to the business cycle.)  The regression estimates 
were then used to predict the path of unemployment during the re-
covery from the current recession. This forecast captures the fact that 
recessions similar in severity to the current one have historically been 
followed by strong rebounds in output and declines in unemployment. 
Thus, in this scenario unemployment begins falling immediately in the 
fourth quarter of 2009, averaging 9 percent for the year. Unemploy-
ment then declines to 6 percent in 2011 and 5 percent in 2013.
(2) The solid line was constructed under the assumption that the 
current recession shares important similarities with the 1990-91 and 
2001 recessions due to structural changes in the labor market. This 
unemployment path was calculated in the same way as the previous 
path, except that the regression estimates were based on data for 1985-
2007.37 This forecast captures the fact that unemployment took a con-
siderable amount of time to decline during the jobless recoveries from 
the 1990-91 and 2001 recessions. Thus, unemployment continues to 
rise into 2010, when it averages 9.7 percent. Unemployment drifts 
down modestly to 9 percent in 2011 and 8 percent in 2012. It does not 
return to 5 percent until 2015.
Chart 8
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(3) Finally, the line with the circular markers was constructed un-
der the assumption that the current combination of a recession and a 
banking crisis is similar to other high-income countries’ experiences. 
This path was calculated using the VAR results from the previous sec-
tion and reflects the international evidence that such episodes have 
large and persistent effects on unemployment.38 Thus, unemployment 
rises above 10 percent and stays there through 2011. Thereafter, un-
employment slowly drifts down to 8 percent by 2014 and 7 percent in 
2016. By the end of the ten-year horizon, unemployment is still greater 
than 6 percent.
To obtain a sense of the weight that economists currently attach to 
each of these outcomes, one can compare the paths with results from 
the Survey of Professional Forecasters issued by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia on May 15, 2009.39 In this survey, forecasters 
were asked to assign probabilities to alternative unemployment out-
comes. For 2011, forecasters assigned a 21 percent probability that un-
employment would be greater than 9.5 percent, consistent with the 
path following banking crises and recessions. Forecasters assigned only 
6 percent probability that unemployment would be below 7 percent, 
consistent with the rebounds following earlier severe recessions. This 
implies that most forecasters saw the greatest likelihood of an unem-
ployment outcome somewhere between these two extremes, similar to 
the path implied by recent recessions. However, forecasters also saw the 
risks as weighted toward higher unemployment outcomes.
Overall, the evidence in this article suggests that unemployment 
could take a considerable time to recover after the current downturn.40 
Such an outcome will be especially likely if recent changes in labor 
markets produce another jobless recovery, or if unemployment follows 
the path associated with banking crises and recessions in other high-
income countries. These results, however, are subject to a number of 
important caveats.
The first of these is the reliance on international data to quantify 
the joint effects of recessions and banking crises. It is clearly possible 
that the United States is “unique,” and hence using international evi-
dence for explaining U.S. unemployment is inappropriate. The con-
ventional view is that U.S. labor markets are more flexible than, for 
instance, European labor markets. This greater flexibility could cause 
the behavior of unemployment in the aftermath of the U.S. banking 22  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
crisis and recession to differ from what occurred in other countries.41 
The United States is also viewed as being less dependent on banks and 
more dependent on capital markets for the provision of credit. This 
difference could make the U.S. economy less responsive to traditional 
banking crises but more responsive to disruptions in capital markets, 
which have been important features of the current crisis.
A second caveat concerns the nature of individual recessions, crises, 
and their policy responses. To combat the current crisis, the Federal 
Reserve reduced its federal funds rate target to close to zero and es-
tablished a variety of programs to mitigate disruptions to the flow of 
credit in the economy, and the federal government implemented the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program in October 2008 and the American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. To the extent that these policy 
responses were faster, stronger, and more effective than the policies 
implemented during previous U.S. recessions or international banking 
crises, their effects may facilitate a faster recovery for unemployment 
than the paths indicate.42
Finally, a third caveat concerns the structural changes in labor mar-
kets noted earlier. Economists are divided regarding the underlying 
causes of the jobless recoveries following the 1990-91 and 2001 reces-
sions, with some citing these structural changes in labor markets as one 
cause, while others have suggested a connection with the mildness of 
those recessions. If the jobless recoveries were related to the depth of 
the recessions, then there is no guarantee that this severe recession will 
also experience a jobless recovery.
A change in the natural rate of unemployment?
This section has shown that unemployment could be persistently 
high during the recovery from the current recession for two possible 
reasons. First, fundamental changes in labor markets may cause unem-
ployment to behave as it did in the jobless recoveries from the 1990-91 
and 2001 recessions. Second, the combination of a banking crisis and 
recession may cause unemployment to behave as in other high-income 
countries that have experienced these events. 
While projecting the level of unemployment is important for poli-
cymakers, an equally important task is determining the natural rate of 
unemployment. This is because unemployment greater than the natu-ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2009  23
ral rate signals slack in the economy, which via the Phillips curve typi-
cally puts downward pressure on inflation.43 An increase in the natural 
rate that coincided with persistently high unemployment would there-
fore imply less slack and less downward pressure on inflation than if the 
natural rate were to remain constant.
If the natural rate remains stable, then persistently high unemploy-
ment would reflect an extreme variant of a jobless recovery, with the 
labor market taking many years to recover.44 This scenario most closely 
corresponds to the jobless recoveries after the 1990-91 and 2001 reces-
sions. In fact, CBO’s estimates of the natural rate were stable to slight-
ly falling around these episodes, reflecting a variety of demographic 
trends. In this case, persistently high unemployment would be a signal 
of spare productive capacity in the economy, which would put down-
ward pressure on wage and price inflation. A case could then be made 
to use monetary or fiscal policy to stimulate the economy and reduce 
unemployment toward the unchanged natural rate, with little risk of 
reigniting inflation.45
Alternatively, persistently high unemployment could instead partly 
reflect an increase in the natural rate. This scenario may be more along 
the lines of what has occurred following international banking crises 
with severe recessions, in which measured natural rates have tended to 
rise.46 Such an outcome may occur through massive structural change in 
the economy. Banking crises are usually associated with structural imbal-
ances, such as overinvestment in housing or overborrowing to support 
consumption on the part of households.47 Correcting these imbalances 
requires reallocating resources, including labor, to now-more productive 
uses. Unfortunately, retraining and relocating to new opportunities can 
be highly time-consuming and costly. To the extent that the concurrent 
housing crisis makes it more difficult for labor to relocate easily, this 
could lengthen the time required for this reallocation.48 
The policy implications of persistently high unemployment would 
be different in this case than the previous one. If the natural rate rises 
along with the actual rate, there may not be as much spare productive 
capacity as the high unemployment rate would seem to indicate.49 In 
this situation, expansionary monetary or fiscal policy may not be re-
quired and could—if unemployment were to fall below the higher level 
of the natural rate—actually cause inflation to accelerate. Policies that, 24  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
for example, retrain workers to reduce the economy’s structural imbal-
ances could instead be more appropriate.
V.   CONCLUSION
In the United States, unemployment has historically fallen quickly 
following severe recessions. Given the severity of the current recession, 
this pattern would suggest a similar rebound may occur over the next 
few years. More recently, however, the United States has experienced 
jobless recoveries following recessions. Changes in the nature of layoffs 
and the rise of just-in-time labor practices appear to have contributed 
to the jobless recoveries, and these factors may serve to restrain the 
recovery from the current recession as well.
Complicating matters, the current recession is also unusual by U.S. 
standards in that it coincides with a banking crisis. Since the United 
States has not had many recent experiences with these crises, this ar-
ticle turns to international data from a large sample of high-income 
countries to provide insight into how unemployment behaves in the 
aftermath of banking crises. In general, this evidence suggests that 
banking crises are associated with large and persistent increases in the 
unemployment rate. Banking crises that coincide with recessions are 
associated with even worse outcomes for unemployment.
Together, the labor market trends that contributed to jobless re-
coveries and the international evidence on banking crises suggest un-
employment could remain high in the United States for a considerable 
time after the current downturn. The policy implications of such a 
persistent rise in unemployment depend crucially on what happens to 
the natural rate of unemployment. As a result, estimates of the natural 
rate are likely to be an important topic for policymakers for the foresee-
able future.ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2009  25
ENDNOTES
1The average recession facts are computed for completed recessions. Because 
of this, they do not include data on the recession that began in 2007, since at the 
time of this writing the end of the recession had not been formally established 
by the NBER. 
2There are various ways to measure the depth of decline in GDP; the mea-
sure in the text compares the level of output at the end of the recession (the 
business cycle trough) with its level at the start of the recession (the business 
cycle peak).
3If measured from the GDP peak in the second quarter of 2008, the decline 
in GDP through the first quarter of 2009 would be 3.1 percent. 
4It is worth noting that the NBER uses data on payroll employment in 
determining recession dates rather than the unemployment rate, since the latter 
measure is affected by labor force participation. Hence the unemployment rate 
is not explicitly part of the determination of recession dates.
5In terms of nonfarm payrolls, payroll employment fell 1.6 percent (1.3 
million) during the 1973-75 recession and 3.1 percent (2.8 million) during the 
1981-82 recession. The one-year period following the recessions saw payroll 
growth of 3.1 percent (2.4 million) after the 1973-75 recession and 3.5 percent 
(3.1 million) after the 1981-82 recession. Through May 2009, payroll employ-
ment had fallen 4.3 percent (6.0 million) in the current recession.
6Wynne and Balke review previous evidence and show a statistically sig-
nificant negative correlation between the peak-to-trough change in industrial 
production during a recession and the growth in industrial production during 
the recovery. While this section focuses attention on unemployment, rebounds 
in these other measures of activity (GDP, production, etc.) are implicit.
7GDP did fall during individual quarters of the 2001 recession, but the 
level of GDP at the business cycle trough was slightly higher than its level at the 
business cycle peak.
8Most analysts use data on nonfarm payroll employment rather than un-
employment to define and assess jobless recoveries. Payroll employment fell 1.1 
percent (1.2 million) during the 1990-91 recession and fell an additional 0.2 
percent (0.2 million) in the following year. Payroll employment fell 1.2 per-
cent (1.6 million) during the 2001 recession and an additional 0.4 percent (0.5 
million) in the year after the recession. In principle, such decreases in payroll 
employment need not be associated with higher unemployment if labor force 
participation is falling at the same time. However, the jobless recoveries mani-
fested themselves not only in decreases in employment but also in substantial 
increases in unemployment.
Focusing on payroll employment also helps explain why the 1969-70 re-
cession is not usually considered to be a jobless recovery. As shown in Chart 3, 26  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
unemployment rose during the year after this recession ended. However, payroll 
employment—which is typically used to mark jobless recoveries—increased by 
2.0 percent (1.4 million workers) during the same time frame.
9See Koenders and Rogerson.
10See Bachmann for a model in which jobless recoveries follow mild reces-
sions due to the presence of hiring and firing costs, exogenous worker separations, 
and the ability of firms to adjust production via either payrolls (the extensive mar-
gin) or hours worked (the intensive margin). In the presence of firing costs, firms 
are reluctant to lay off workers during a mild recession, preferring instead to allow 
attrition to reduce payrolls. Allowing firms to adjust hours worked contributes to 
the joblessness of the recovery, since firms will turn to this intensive margin first 
before hiring new workers, which is costly.
11For more details on just-in-time labor practices, see Schreft and Singh and 
Schreft and others, as well as Groshen and Potter and Aaronson and others (2004a, 
2004b). Note that the unemployment effects of just-in-time practices depend partly 
on the type of labor practice(s) utilized. For instance, hiring a worker part-time 
when that worker did not previously have another job but was looking for work 
would reduce the unemployment rate. On the other hand, extending hours worked 
of existing employees would have no effect on the unemployment rate.
12Groshen and Potter, Aaronson and others (2004b), and Faberman discuss 
permanent and temporary layoffs during the 1990-91 and 2001 recessions. Analysts 
have cited a number of labor market changes—such as modifications to unem-
ployment insurance laws, the gradual decline of unionized labor, the trend from 
goods-producing to service-producing jobs, and the rise of just-in-time employ-
ment—that have all likely contributed to this shift toward more permanent layoffs.
13In fact, temporary layoffs may also allow for faster improvement in the 
economy, since temporarily laid-off workers can be relatively confident in their 
future employment prospects and therefore be more confident in their spend-
ing—which in turn can cause firms to reverse temporary layoffs once conditions 
begin to improve.
14The importance of structural reallocation in the 1990-91 and 2001 reces-
sions and jobless recoveries is a source of considerable debate; see Groshen and 
Potter, Aaronson and others (2004b) and McConnell and Tracy.
15Gomme notes the importance of exceptionally low job-finding rates dur-
ing the jobless recoveries; and Groshen and Potter, and Schreft and others, stress 
uncertainty related to restrained hiring.
16While much analysis suggests that just-in-time labor practices tend to delay 
hiring and thereby contribute to jobless recoveries, an opposing view suggests that 
some forms of just-in-time labor (e.g., the use of temps) should be less costly than 
hiring permanent workers, and therefore that firms should use these cost-effective 
labor inputs more rapidly rather than less rapidly. See, for instance, Congressional 
Budget Office (2005) and Ferguson. ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2009  27
17For more evidence on changes in labor market dynamics, see Knotek, 
Bachmann, and Faberman for VAR evidence related to job creation and job de-
struction.
18See Reinhart and Rogoff (2008c).
19See, for instance, Chapter 3 of International Monetary Fund for a more 
comprehensive analysis of the periods preceding banking crises. Using data on 
house price inflation, stock market gains, and capital inflows, Reinhart and Rog-
off (2008b) conclude that conditions before the onset of the U.S. crisis in 2007 
were comparable to the preludes of some of the most severe banking crises in 
foreign countries.
20In their baseline specification, Cerra and Saxena consider the output re-
sponse to a banking crisis using the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) 
estimator for the following model with their unbalanced panel of countries: 




where gi,t is percent GDP growth in country i at time t and Di,t is a dummy vari-
able taking on the value of one if a banking crisis began at time t in country i and 
zero otherwise. The specification of the model in growth rates rather than levels 
of GDP is justified by Cerra and Saxena using evidence in Nelson and Plosser 
and results from panel unit root tests.
21Other studies that examine the frequency and severity of banking crises 
along with subsequent output declines and economic ramifications include Claes-
sens and others, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a), Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b), 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008c), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and International 
Monetary Fund. A key question in these studies is the direction of causation: 
do banking crises cause declines in output, or does the anticipation of output 
declines cause banking crises?  For evidence that the causation runs from banking 
crises to declines in output, see Bordo and others and Dell’Ariccia and others.
22The dates of the crises are available in Table A3 in Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008c). Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a) also examine the frequency of banking 
crises. For an alternative set of banking crises dates, see Caprio and Klingebiel.
23The definition of high-income used here comes from the World Bank: 
economies with 2007 gross national income per capita, calculated using the 
World Bank Atlas method, of $11,456 or more.
24Data availability varies by country, with the OECD data beginning in 
1960 and the WDI data beginning in 1980. In cases where the unemployment 
rate is missing for a particular year but available for the previous year and the 
next year, the missing value is linearly interpolated. Structural breaks in the un-
employment series were treated on an individual basis. GDP growth from 1960 
to 2007, available in the WDI database, is also used in this article.28  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
25More precisely, this section estimates a VAR for GDP growth git and unem-
ployment uit in country i at time t of the form: 
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 The unemployment path is calculated from the coefficient estimates in the spirit 
of an impulse response, assuming the banking crisis begins in year 0 (Dt=1 for t=0 
and 0 otherwise) and equation residuals equal zero in all years. Lag lengths were 
chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). See Evans for estimation 
of a similar VAR using U.S. data. While panel unit root tests indicate that the 
international unemployment data are nonstationary, estimation of the VAR us-
ing either levels of unemployment or first differences of unemployment produces 
quantitatively and qualitatively similar unemployment paths through the first four 
to five years after the beginning of the crisis in Charts 6, 7, and 8. Thereafter, the 
paths differ slightly, with more persistent effects in the models using first differ-
ences. As in Cerra and Saxena, there is bias arising from the use of LSDV with 
lagged dependent variables, but the length of the panel suggests that the bias is 
relatively small and that estimation via LSDV is appropriate as outlined by Judson 
and Owen.
26These estimates incorporate 33 high-income nations and 20 banking crises 
in an unbalanced panel with 977 observations. The sample ranges from 1960 to 
2007. Based on the AIC, the VAR is estimated with 3 lags.
27An unemployment path very similar to the VAR estimates in Chart 6 can be 
obtained by simply plotting the average movement in unemployment after bank-
ing crises in high-income countries.
28In particular, Claessens and others, and International Monetary Fund, find 
that financial stress is linked to increased recession severity.
29See Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) for more on the Big Five.
30The VARs estimated here are identical to the model in note 25 of GDP 
growth g, unemployment u, and crises D, except that Di,t is redefined in each 
case as a dummy for country i at time t indicating (1) the start of a banking crisis 
with a recession, (2) the start of a banking crisis without a recession, or (3) the 
start of a recession without a banking crisis. The unemployment paths in Chart 7 
are constructed in the spirit of an impulse response by assuming that each event 
begins in year 0 and equation residuals are zero in all years. The VAR using start 
dates of banking crises with recessions is estimated on an unbalanced panel with 
33 countries, 13 crises with recessions, 977 observations, and 3 lags based on the 
AIC. The VAR using start dates of banking crises without recessions is estimated 
on an unbalanced panel with 33 countries, 7 crises without recessions, 977 ob-
servations, and 3 lags. The VAR using start dates of recessions without banking 
crises is estimated on an unbalanced panel with 33 countries, 52 recessions, 977 
observations, and 3 lags.ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2009  29
31For banking crises without recessions, the fact that the one standard-error 
shading includes zero indicates there is not a statistically significant change in the 
unemployment rate after such an event.
32Alternatively, one could obtain a similar result by instead plotting the average 
unemployment path following the recessions that were not associated with crises.
  33This can be succinctly captured by examining the sum of coefficients on 
the dummy variables in the GDP growth equation in the VAR. For the dummy 
variables indicating the start of banking crises with recessions, the estimated sum 
of coefficients on these dummies is −6.1; for the dummy variables indicating the 
start of a recession without a banking crisis, the sum of coefficients is −4.0.
34Empirically, the sum of the coefficients in the unemployment VAR equation 
on the banking crises with recession dummies shows that approximately 1.3 per-
centage points of the increase in unemployment is not linked to the output channel. 
35To make the paths comparable, all projections were assumed to follow 
exactly the forecasts in the Blue Chip Economic Indicators survey dated May 
10, 2009, through the third quarter of 2009, which a majority of respondents 
expected to be the business cycle trough.
36Specifically, path (1) was constructed based on the empirical model:
∆ ∆ ∆ u u u u u t t t c t t = − − − − − − − − 0 79 0 21 0 05 1 2 1 1 1 . . . ( )
* 0 0 003 1 1
2 . ( ) ,
* u u t t − − −  estimated over 
the period 1949Q1 through 1984Q4, where ∆ut is the change in the unemploy-
ment rate at time t, ut−1
* is the natural rate of unemployment at time t –1, and 
(ut-1– ut−1
* ) is the unemployment gap at time t −1. The estimates for the natural 
rate of unemployment are from the Congressional Budget Office.
37Path  (2)  was  constructed  based  on  the  empirical  model: 
∆ ∆ ∆ u u u u u t t t t t = + − − + − − − − 0 47 0 18 0 07 0 1 2 1 1 . . . ( ) .
* 0 01 1 1
2 ( )
*
, u u t t − − − estimated over 
the period 1985Q1 through 2007Q3.
38Path (3) was constructed using the estimated coefficients from the cross-
country panel regression for banking crises with recessions in note 29, along with 
the U.S. fixed effects from the regression. Because the VAR uses annual data, this 
projection also required fourth quarter forecasts of unemployment and growth 
from the May 10, 2009, Blue Chip Economic Indicators survey. The crisis and 
recession dummy took the value of 1 during 2007, consistent with Reinhart and 
Rogoff’s dating of the crisis (and the NBER’s dating of the recession), and zero 
thereafter. As with the earlier related charts, this path is constructed in the spirit 
of an impulse response by assuming that all shocks (equation residuals) after 
2009 are zero.
39As of May 15, 2009, forecasters would have had access to the April unem-
ployment rate of 8.9 percent.
40Daly and others consider a number of other measures associated with the 
U.S. labor market—but excluding international evidence on banking crises—
and arrive at a similar conclusion.30  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
41Another factor that could cause unemployment to rise less in the U.S. fol-
lowing the current recession is that unemployment benefits are not as generous 
or as long-lasting as in other OECD countries (for instance, Nickell and others). 
However, components of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
have closed a portion of the difference by increasing and extending U.S. unem-
ployment benefits.
42For more on the features of policy responses to combinations of banking 
crises and recessions, see International Monetary Fund.
43Over sufficiently long time periods, the natural rate and the non-acceler-
ating inflation rate of unemployment, or NAIRU, are typically thought to be 
equivalent; see Congressional Budget Office (2002) for a longer discussion.
44The CBO currently projects the natural rate will remain at 4.8 percent 
through 2019. Recall that this estimate was used in Chart 8 to predict how unem-
ployment would evolve if the recovery from the current recession resembles labor 
market dynamics that have characterized the post-1985 period, including the two 
jobless recoveries (the solid line). Thus, the prediction based on the recent reces-
sions implicitly assumes the natural rate remains unchanged.
45An extended jobless recovery along these lines might contradict the no-
tion of hysteresis: the process by which a rise in unemployment is large enough 
and persistent enough that such an outcome by itself causes a rise in the natural 
rate, as workers who are unemployed for a long time may lose important skills 
and be perceived as less employable. Hysteresis may not have been a large issue 
following the 1990-91 and 2001 recessions because of the modest increases in 
unemployment; given the severity of the current recession, however, it may be of 
greater concern. In turn, the potential for hysteresis would be another reason for 
stimulative policy actions to prevent increases in unemployment from becoming 
permanent. For more on hysteresis, see Krugman, as well as Blanchard and Sum-
mers, Ljungvist and Sargent, and Ball.
46See Gianella and others for evidence that the measured natural rate of un-
employment rose around each of the Big Five crises documented in the box in 
Section III. Strictly speaking, the empirical methodology and the lack of a formal 
theoretical model prevent this paper from taking a strong stand on correlation 
versus causation in the issue of whether a recession and a banking crisis cause an 
increase in the natural rate or, potentially, whether an increase in the natural rate 
precedes or perhaps even causes the recession and banking crisis.
47International Monetary Fund discusses some of these issues in more depth. 
Large losses of equity and housing wealth associated with these types of events 
may also play a role in boosting measured unemployment, as labor force partici-
pation rates rise and unemployed workers remain in the labor force longer as they 
seek to recoup these losses.
48For more, see in particular the discussion in Congressional Budget Office 
(2002) regarding structural unemployment and its implications for the natural rate.ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2009  31
49Using an alternative methodology, Weidner and Williams find that the 
natural rate of unemployment is now likely well above the CBO’s estimates, sug-
gesting there may not be as much slack in the economy as the CBO’s analysis 
would predict.32  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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